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1. Introduction
As opposed to the other branches of a fuel cycle industry, the fissile
material is contained in weIl defined geometrical forms like fuel pins,
in apower reactor of the presently known types. Under normal conditions,
any change in the fissile material composition or concentration during
its passage through the reactor, occurs inside the fuel pins and the
fissile material cannot be lost directly in a waste stream as in the case
of a reprocessing or a fabrication plant. In case it could be ensured
that the pins or subassemblies containing the fissile material remain
intact during their stay inside the reactor and that only those pins or
subassemblies which have been identified at the entrance of a reactor can
enter the reactor vessel for irradiation and leave it after a certain
interval of time. no other safetmard measures would be reauired to contro1- -- ----- - ---- -., ----- - ----- -----'-1------- ~--------- .,.,..----- -- --;I" - --. ----.----
the fissile material flow through a reactor power station. This means only
those measures which are requiired to ensure containment would be sufficient.
1) Gesellschaft f'ür Kernforschung, Karlsruhe
2) Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, Erlangen
3) Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft, AEG-Telefunken, Frankfurt
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1.1 It is however, possible, at least in principle, to establish a
fissile material balance also in a reactor. The fissile material content
of the subassemblies entering or leäving a reactor may be deter.mined with
varying degrees of accuracy. A detailed analysis of the possibility of
establishing a material balance on the basis of reactor data indicate,
that they are inaccurate to the range of .±. 5 - 15 %. This point has been
analysed in some detail in App. I. Measures based on material balance alone
cannot be regarded as effective enough for safeguarding purposes, although
some of the data used for this purpose might be utilized as independent
information for implementing containment measures.
1.2 The present analysis indicates that power reactors of the presently
known types are weIl suited for the safeguarding of fissile material mainly
with the help of containment measures.
2. Common features of safeguards in power reactors of different tyPes
Four reactors were chosen to evaluate the possibility of realizing various
containment measures at strategie points. The general characteristics of
these reactors are given in table I.
Table I: Reactors chosen for safeguards studies
Name Locat ion Supplier Present state
(1968)
Kernkraftwerk PWR, 3.0 %U, batch
Obrigheim (KWO) loading









BWR, 2.2 %U, batch
loading
Argentina Siemens AG. Expected start-up
West Germany 1971
W.Germany Siemens AG. Expected start up
West Germany 1968 end
W.Germany AEG Expected start up
West Germany 1971
W.Germany AEG In full power
West Germany operation since
July 1968
The layout of the relevant reactor parts, the movements of the fuel elements
and the possible safeguärds measures for these power stations have been
discussed in chapters 3 and 4 of this paper. Inspite of the apparent
differences in the reactor designs chosen for this purpose, some common
features are evident from the point of view of safeguarding fissile material.
These features are summarized below. It should however, be noted that they
are applicable to the reactor designs considered in this paper.
2.1 Fuel element movement in a nuclear power station takes place throUgh
three distinct containment areas, namely, the storage area for fresh fuel
elements (dry storage), the reactor vessel, and storage pond for irradiated
fuel elements (wet storage). Fresh fuel elements can always be stored in
wet storage area, but irradiated fuel elements cannot be stored in dry storage
area without heavy shielding.
2.2 Movement of fuel elements between two containment areas can be effecti-
vely monitored and registered both for on-load and off-load discharging
reactor types.
2.3 With a combination of three safeguards measures, a) identification and
counting of fuel elements in the two storage areas, b) registration of the
movement and loading of the fuelling machines and of the reactor bay crane
and c) registration of the activity level in the reactor bay, the movement
and location of fuel elements between the three containment areas can be
uniquely established as a function of time.
2.4 The three containment areas represent also the three strategie points
at which all the safeguards measures are confined. However, the presence
of inspectors, if at all, is required only at the storage areas and only
during the transport periods. To safeguard fuel movementJPresence of inspec-
tors is not required in the reactor bay, or in the wet storage area during
the refuelling procedure itself.
2.5 Records of integrated power output and some other general operation data
from a reactor power station may be utilized as redundant information but are
not essential for fulfilling safeguard duties.
2.6 From the point of view of safeguard, only limited information on the
layout of a reactor power station is required. They are:
a) Location and overall layout of the three containment areas.
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b) Trans:rer mechanisms :ror f'uel elements :rrom and to the reactor
vessel and the two other containment areas, as well as, between
the containment areas and outside world.
c) Number and f'unction o:r all the machines and apparatus in the
reactor bay which can be used to remove f'uel elements :rrom the
reactor.
d) Maximum possible number of fiel subassemblies for a eore end the
veight of each sUbassembly.
3. Fuel movement in the :rour power stations
In this chapter, the :ruel movements between the three cofitaiIlJlient areas
have been discussed :ror the :rour nuclear power stations mentioned in table I.
Technical data relevant from the point of view o:r safeguarding, have been
summarized in table 11 for CNA-Atucha, in table 111 :ror KWO and in table IV
for KWW and KWL. Besides the normal technical data on reactors and subas-
semblies ,data on the two storage areas as weIl as the types and number of
machines available for subassembly transfer between these containment areas
have also been included in these tables. Fig. 1 shows the layout of the
three containment areas and the f'uel transfer mechanisms between these areas
for the Atucha reactor. They are shown in Fig. 2 for the KWO, in Fig. 3 for
KWL and in Fig. 4 :ror KWW. The broad outlines of the f'uel subassemblies for
Atucha and KWO are shown in Fig. 5. Fig. 6 gives a slightly more detailed
drawing of the KWL subassembly. The subassembly for KWW has not been show
as it is very similar to that for KWL.
3.1 Fuel movement in Atucha reactor (Fig. 1)
The heavy water natural uranium power reactor called Atucha, designed by
Siemens AG. West Germany, will be supplied to Argentina. The reactor station
will have an installed electrical power of 340 MWe and is expected to go
into operation in 1971. This reactor type appears to be particularly interest-
ing for safeguard studies because of its on-load f'uelling system.
In this reactor~ the dry and the wet storage areas are outside the reactor
containment building. The fresh subassemblies are stored in the dry storage
area which is also in the spent fuel building. Normally the reactor is re-
fuelled on-load. The fresh subassemblies are lowered into the wet storage
pond using a light hoist~ and are introduced into the reactor bay through the
same transfer system through which the irradiated subassemblies are removed
(see below). Alternatively~ however, it may be desirable at times~ to move
new fuel into the reactor while it is shut down. The fresh subassemblies can
be introduced into the reactor bay through the material lock and can be in-
serted in the reactor vessel with the help of the reactor-bay crane. The crane
can reach the reactor vessel only when the reactor is shut down~ as only then
the concrete roof, separating the crane from the reactor vessel can be removed.
Irradiated fuel elements under normal conditions are removed on-load with the
help of the fuelling machine. The machine is positioned over the closure of
a subassembly to be unloaded and flooded internally with high pressure heavy
water (120 Atm.). The closure is opened remotely with the help of a gripping
tool, the fuel element is lifted out of the reactor vessel and the closure
is closed again. The fuelling machine with the subassemblies goes to the
intermediate decay tubes af'terdepressurization, discharges the subassembly
into one of these and goes back to the next subassembly closure. The drying
machine which was over the outlet/inlet point during this operation, comes
over to the decay tube and picks up the discharged subassembly. This is then
dried in an air stream (to remove D20) inside the drying machine and the unit
is moved over to the outlet/inlet point. The subassembly is lowered into the
H20 filled tilting flask after which the drying machine becomes free to take
over the next subassembly. The tilting flask containing the subassembly is
brought to a horizontal position and coupled to the fuel transfer tube in
the transfer bay. In the transfer tube, the subassembly is loaded into a
roller carriage which carries it through a water lock filled with light
water, to the wet storage area. The subassembly is taken out here with the
help of a tilting fixture, erected to a vertical position and is stored in
racks provided for this purpose. The wet and the dry storage areas are
spanned by a 60 t crane which can lift transport casks, used for transport-
ing irradiated fuel elements from the reactor-station to a reprocessing plant.
In case the fuelling machine is out of order,a 30 t lead flask with the neces-
sary hoisting mechanism,which is kept permanently in the reactor bay, can be
used to lift fuel elements directly out of the reactor when it is shut down.
This flask can be brought to the wet storage using the RB crane, the material
lock, a special truck and the spent fuel building crane.
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3.2 Fuel movement in KWO reactor (Fig. 2)
The 300 MWe pressurized water, slightly enriched uranium reactor at
Obrigheim (KWO) has been designed by the f'irm Siemens AG. The
erection 01' this reactor is virtually complete and the station should
go into operation by the end of' 1968. It is typical of' the PWR type reactors
which is expected to be installed in the near future.
The dry storage area of' this power station is outside the reactor contain-
ment whereas, the wet storage area is inside it.
The fresh subassemblies are transf'ered from the dry storage, through the
material air lock, to the wet storage area. They are lowered into the
storage racks. with the help of' the f'resh f'uel lowering f'ixture. Normally,
the fuelling machine is used to load the f'irst core as weIl as f'or subse-
quent core loadings. But in principle, the reactor bay crane can also be
used in conjunction with a simple fuel handling tool.
Irradiated subassemblies can be removed from the reactor vessel only under
off-load condition. For this purpose, the reactor is shut down and after
some cooling time, the lid of' the reactor vessel is removed with the reactor
bay (RB) crane. The space above the reactor is f'looded with water and the
level is brought up to that in the wet storage area. Bef'ore the refuelling
begins , the upper core structure is lii'ted also with the RB crane and set
aside. The sluice gate, which separates the reactor bay f'rom the wet storage
area is then removed. The fuelling machine containing a double gripper,
lifts an irradiated subassembly f'rom the reactor vessel, carries it under
water to the wet storage end deposits it in one 01' the spent fuel storage
racks. While returning, it picks up a f'resh subassembly, carries it back
to the reactor vessel end deposits it into the empty position caused by the
removal of' the subassembly. One of' the grippers is used f'or the movement
of' subassemblies end the other, f'or the reshuf'f'ling of the control rods
from one subassembly to the other. This reshuf'f'ling cen be carried out
either in the reactor vessel or in the wet storage area. Each time the
reactor vessel is opened up f'or refuelling, about one third the total core
loading is removed. In principle, the removal of' irradiated subassemblies
can also be done with the help of' the RB crane. The ref'uelliqmachine is also
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used to load the spent fuel fram the vet storage into a shielded cask.
This cask is lifted by the RB-crane out of the pond and is trmsferred
through the material lock to a reprocessing plant.
3.3 Fuel 1DOvement in KWW and KWL power stations (Fig.3 and 4)
Both the KWL and the KW power stations are of the boiling vater type and
are designed by the firm AEG. The KWL station has an iastalled capacity
of around lSO MWe from nuclear and about 90 MWe fram fossile superheat
and is located at Lingen, West Germany. Tbe construction of this plant
started in 1964 and it went into full power in July 1968. The 600 KWe
KW slatien will be erected at WUrgassen, West Germany and is expected to
go into operation in 1971.
Even though the basic principle of loading and unloa~ing of f~el for these
two boiling water reactors are the same, both of them have ben chosen for
the present analysis, as the layout of the three containment areas and the
fuel routes inside the power station are somewbat different for the two
reactors.
In the KWL station, the three containment areas are all located inside the
reactor containment. Tbe fresh subassemblies are brought inside the reactor
containment through the material lock which is located at a height of 32 •
fram the ground level. They are picked up by the refuelling machine inside
the containment and transfered to the dry storage. As in the case of EWO,
the RB-crane cen also be used for transferring the fresh subassemblies
directly to the reactor bay for the first and subsequent core loadings,
or for lifting the irradiated subassemblies fram the core. But in normal
practice, the fuelling and refuelling are &lvays done with the fuelling
machine.
Tbe irradiated subassemblies ean bc diseh&rged only after the reaetor i.
shut down. The concrete roof of the reactor bay is first removed with the
RB crane and then the reactor head. The reactor bay is flooded with water
up to the level of the adjoining vet storage area. Tbe upper core structure
is lifted with the RB crane and set aside in position 1.703. The sluice gate
between the wet storage end the reactor bay is removed end the fuelling
machine starts transferring the irradiated subassemblies under water fram
the reactor core to the wet storage. On iu vay back, it picks up a fresh
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subassembly from the wet storage racks and inserts it into the core in
the empty space caused by the removal of a subassembly. In this case
also, about one fourth the total number of subassemblies is removed per
discharge. No reshuffling on control rods from one subassembly to the
other is carried out as the control rods are placed between the subassem-
blies and are not shifted radially during the life time of a core.
The fUelling machine is equipped with a light crane for transferring fresh
subassemblies from the dry to the wet storage area and a gripper for lift-
ing irradiated subassemblies from the reactor core and transporting them
to the wet storage.
The method of filling the shielded cask with irradiated subassemblies,
for transporting them from the reactor to a reprocessing plant, is the
same as that :tor tlieKWO station.
The KWW power station uses apressure suppression system for the reactor
containment. For this reason, both the dry storage and the wet storage
areas are outside the reactor containment. Subassembly movement mechanisms
are however, very similar to those in the KWL station.
The fresh subassemblies are lifted to a height of39.5 m (operation platform
for the reactor bay) with the help of the RB crane,and transferred to
the dry storage area. A light crane in the dry storage area is used to
arrange these subassemblies in the racks. The fuelling machine carries
the fresh subassemblies from the dry to the wet storage area.
As in the case of the other light water reactors discussed here, refuelling
can be done only under off-load condition in this station also. For this
purpose however, the top part of the reactor containment has to be removed
with the RB-crane. After the removal of the reactor vessel head, a cylin-
drical steel structure is placed on top of the containment to facilitate
flooding of the area above the containment and to raise the water level to
that of the adjacent wet storage. The removal of the irradiated subassemblies
with the fuelling machine starts after the sluice gate between the wet
storage and the flooded area has been removed. Rest of the subassembly
movements is similar to those used in the KWL station.
4. Safeguards measures
All the teehnieal data, whieh appear to be relevant for safeguards
studies, have been summarized in table V for the four power stations.
It is to be noted that these reaetors are all fuelled either with
natural uranium or with slightly enriehed uranium. Beeause of this,
the fresh subassemblies themselves eannot be of great interest as
objeets of diversion. However, their importanee inereases immediately
on irradiation in the reaetor, beeause of the production of plutonium.
4.1 First safeguard measure
The first safeguard measure has therefore, to eonsist ofzegistration
and identifieation of all the fuel subassemblies whieh enter the power
station. In a elosed fuel eyele this measure is somewhat easier to
perform than for an isolated power station, as the produetion output
of the fabrieation plant ean then be eheeked with the input of subassem-
blies in the power station.
The identifieation markings of subassemblies have to be as tamper resistan-
ee as praetieable. The importanee of this faet eannot be over-emphasized.
Individual subassemblies cannot be physieally traeked and verified for
safeguarding during their life times in a reaetor end the possibility cf
partial or eomplete replaeement of a subassembly during this period eannot
be eompletely eliminated. Therefore, proper identifieation and sealing
is the only way of ensuring that the same subassembly identified at the
entranee of a reaetor, also leaves the reaetor after the irradiation end
eooling period.
The first safeguard measure ean best be earried out in the dry storage
area where the fresh subassemblies are stored berore their transfer to
the wet storage or the reaetor bay area. The dry storage area ean therefore,
be regarded as the first strategie point.
The same safeguard measure of registration and identifieation has to be
performed at the wet storage area, inwhieh both fresh end spent sub-
assemblies are stored. This area ean be regarded as the seeond strategie
point. It should be noted that in all the four power stations, the wet
storage has a eonsiderably higher eapaeity than the dry storage.
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In the wet storage area, an additional safeguard action has to be performed
when the spent subassemblies are loaded into a cask for transporting them
to a reprocessing plant, namely, the sealing of the cask. However, this
measure will not be necessary in case the irradiated subassemblies are
permanently stored in thi s area.
4.2 Other safeguard measures
Introduction: In case it could be assured or assumed that,
a) only those subassemblies which are registered and identified
at the strategic point 1 can be irradiated in the reactor
and
b) all the irradiated subassemblies have to appear in the wet
storage area,
then only the first safeguard measure would be sufficient for controlling
the flow of fissile material in reactors of the types considered here.
However, at the present stage, and with existing reactor facilities, the
probability of irradiation of subassemblies or other fuel units, which
have not been identified and in which plutonium could be produced, cannot
be completely eliminated. Therefore, some additional measures to monitor
the movement of fuel to and from the reactor vessel have to be taken. It
should be noted that all monitoring measures fall under the category of
containment measures. Before these measures are discussed, some characteris-
tics of the four reactor systems should be mentioned.
a) In all the four reactors, subassemblies can be removed or inserted
only from the top of the reactor vessel.
b} A number steps have to be
taken in the reactor bay area for inserting or removing a fuel sub-
assembly.
c) Only a limited number of special lif'ting machines are available
in the reactor bay area which can be used to carry out these steps.
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d) Irradiation of fuel subassemblies in these reactors is always
associated with an increase in radioactivity in these subassem-
blies. If an irradiated subassembly is lifted out of a reactor,
the environment at the top of the reactor vessel is bound to
show an increase over the bakcground activity, unless the lifted
subassembly is shielded.
4.2.1 Second safeguard measure: The movement of the fuelling machine
and the load which it carries during this movement, can be registered
easily with the help of a distance-cum-load measuring instrument which
can be mounted at a suitable point on the fuelling machine. A typical
printout from such an instrument, which has been used to register the
movement of the fuelling machine at the KWO power station, is shown in
Fig. 7a and the illustrated version of the same printout in Fig. 7b.
It shows the distance-load diagram during the loading of some subassem-
blies in the reactor vessel. The lower part shows the depths travelled
and the upper part, the loads carried by the fuelling machine for the
corresponding depths. The abscissa gives the time. In this diagram the
machine travelled back and forth between the reactor vessel and the
wet storage.
If the reactor bay crane be also fitted with a similar instrument, the
printout from this instrument would indicate whether the crane has been
used for moving subassemblies from or to the reactor vessel. Thus, regi-
stration of all the lifting mechanisms in the reactor bay would provide
a simple but effective means of monitoring the movement of fuels in the
reactor bay, provided of course, such mechanisms have been used to move
fuels.
Registration of the movements and loads carried by lifting mechanisms
in the reactor bay and over the waste storage area, may therefore, be
regarded as the second safeguard measure for these reactors.
4.2.2 Third safeguard measure: In case the regular lifting mechanisms
are not used to take out an irradiated subassembly from the reactor,
but some other provisional lifting structures are used for this purpose
(which is theoretically possible), the distance-load instruments would
not indicate the fuel movement. The third safeguard measure is proposed
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to monitor the fuel movement in such cases. This consists of a
continuous registration of activity level in the reactor bay area on
top of the reactor vessel. The sensing units have to be mounted and
arranged in such a way that falsification of input data becomes diffi-
cult.
Any movement of the lifting mechanisms inthe reactor bay over the
reactor head - if associated with a sUbassembly movement- could mean
only two things:
a) The subassemblies have been reshuffled inside the reactor core,
or taken out for observation and put back into the same position;
in this case all the moved fuel would have to go back to the
reactor vessel and the number of subassemblies in the dry and
the wet storage area would remain unchanged.
b) A loading or an unloading of subassemblies for the reactorcore
has taken place. In that case, each of the outgoing movement
from the reactor vessel to the wet storage has to be associated
with an increase in the number of subassemblies in the wet
storage area. Similarly, the ingoing movements can be associated
with a change in the number of subassemblies either in the dry
or in the wet storage area. In a like manner, the increase in
activity over the reactor vessel area may be checked with the
ehange in the number of subassemblies in the dry or the wet
storage.
Thus, a combination of these two measures can monitor the fuel movement
fairly effectively between the three containment areas.
It shOuld be noted that apart of the second safeguard measure and the
third safeguard measure are carried out in the reactor bay area. There-
fore, theoretieally this area can be regarded as the third strategie
point. However, it is important to realize, that the presenee of inspeetors
are not required at this point to implement these measures.
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5. Development work necessary
Of the three safeguards measures suggested in chapter 4, the second
one, based on the registration of movement and loading history of all
the relevant lifting mechanisms, is relatively simple to carry out.
Standard instruments for this purpose are available in the market.
However, some development work, to improve the sensitivity of the
instrument and to make them tamper resistant , would be necessary.
A larger research and development effort would be required before the
other two measures can be effectively implemented. The problems involved
and the type of work necessary are discussed below.
5.1 Sealing and identification of subassemblies
It was indicated in 4.1 that sealing and identification of subassemblies
is the most important of the three safeguards measures discussed. It may
be noted that this measure is required at three nuclear facilities in
the fuel cycle. The fresh subassemblies have to be sealed in a fabrication
plant. These seals have to be checked and identified in the dry and wet
storage areas of a nuclear power station, and finally, they have to be
checked and identified once more in the wet storage of a reprocessing
plant, in case the subassemblies are reprocessed.
Two types of development work are required. Firstly, development of the
sealing of subassemblies , and secondly, development of the identification
system in the wet storage area.
The main purpose of sealing is to ensure that the subassemblies remain
intact during their passage between two strategie points. Without
sealing, fuel pins can be introduced or replaced, with varying degrees
cf efforts, in the subassemblies (Figs.5, 6) for the four reactor types
considered here. Sealing of these subassemblies have to be done in such
a way that any tampering can be detected with a high degree of probability.
It should remain intact and identifiable during the irradiation of sub-
assemblies in the reactor and later on, during their storage in the wet
storage area. It should be possible to reseal a subassembly in the wet
storage area, under the filling medium (which is water in most cases)
in case some damaged pins in an irradiated subassembly have to be replaced.
Finally, i t should be economic. For this purpose, development work has
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to be done in three areas, namely, design of different methods of seal-
ing, fabrication of prototype sealed subassemblies and irradiation
experiments with sealed subassemblies in a reactor.
The main problem of identification lies in remotely .identifying the
seals on irradiated subassemblies in the wet storage under the filling
medium. A photographic under water identification system for irradiated
subassemblies has been reported by Kindermann 1-1_1. Further development
on similar lines might be necessary for effective identification.
5.2 Measurement of activity in reactor bay
The detection and registration of activities of irradiated fUel sub-
assemblies, in the flooded bay over the reactor vessel by fixed and
sealed detectors, requires solution of a number of problems. The detec-
tors must be sensitive enough to give a clear signal which should be signi-
ficantly different to the actual background signal. They must be able to
distinguish between a simulated and an actual signal and must be specific
for irradia.ted fuel subassemblies. They should operate unattented over
long periods of time.
Some idea on the required sensitivity of the detector can be obtained
from Fig. 8. The activity of a fuel subassembly, which has been irradiated
in a boiling water reactor at a constant thermal power of 1 MW, as measured
under water by a detector placed at various distances , has been shown
with decay time after shut-down as the parameter. For other subassembly
powers, the values of Fig. 8 have simply to be multiplied with the actual
thermal power in MW. As an example, the KWL subassembly with about 2 MWth
rating, would show an activity of around 4 mr/hrat a distance of 2.5 m,
9 days after shut down of the reactor. The background level of the water
in the flooded area of the reactor bay, is around 10 mr/hr. The minimum
possible distance between subassemblies and the detector range from 3 to
4 meters. This shows that for light water reactors considered here, impor-
tant refinements over the presently known detection methods would be re-
quired. For the heavy water reactor, because of the absence of water in
the reactor bay, the conditions which the detectors have to meet, would
be less severe.
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Gamma energy detectors appear to be the most suitable, although f'or
under water detection, Cerenkov radiation might also be usef'ul.
Any detector system, which might be developed, have to be tested over
long periods of' time under actual operating conditions in a. reactor.
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2.1 Hax. Number of lubassemblies
in reactor core
2.2 Largest diamete.!:, of_
subassembly L mm_1
2.3 Length of subassembly
(in cooling medium)
L-mm_7
2.4 Total length of subassembly
(including shielding length)
L-mm_7
2.5 U02-weight per subassembly
L-k~1












2.6 Total weight per subassembly 217
L-k~1
2.7 Number of f'uel pins per suba..embly 36
2.8 Fuel pin diameter L-mm_1 11.9




One cylindrical vessel welded to a round bottom, having 4 openings
for cooling medium, and 3 for moderator.
One flanged top with 253 openings for cooling medium, 29 for control
rods end a number of small holes for instrumentation.
253 fuel element closures with cannecting rods.
One vessel support ring.
One complete insulation for the vessel surface.
Major dimensions
3.01 Internal diameter of the cylinder L-mm_1
3.02 Largest outside diameter of the
cylinder Lmm_1
3.03 C~linder height (without cover)
L mm_1
3.04 External diameter of the cover L-mm_1
3.05 Height of the cover /-mm_/
3.06 Maximum height of the reactor pressure
vesse1 (from the bottom to the top of the
c.Q.olant opening)
Lmm_1
3.07 Weight of the lower part L-t_1
3.08 Weight of the top cover L-t....!
3.09 Nuts and bolts and spacers L- t _I





















L x W x H L-m_7
5.2 Storage capabi1ity
Number of subassemb1ies
6. Subassemb1y transfer machines
6.1 Heavy crane for transport of fresh
subassemb1ies from outside into the
dry storage area
6.2 Heavy crane for removing shielding,
refue11ing machine, pressure vesse1
lid and irradiated subassemb1ies in
a shie1ded cask from the reactor
(for emergency purposes on1y)
6.3 Sma11 crane for light duty
inside reactor room
6.4 Light crane for handling fresh fue1
elements within the dry storage
6.5 Fue11ing machine, containing fue1
element hoist for fue1 transport
between reactor vesse1 and wet
storage (weight 60 t)
6.5.1 Light crane for bringing fresh fue1
from dry storage to wet storage
1300
10 x 2.2 x 12
200
l(with two hoisting mechanism.)
(60 + 5 t)
1

















2.1 Number of subassemb1ies
in reactor core
2.2 Cross section of subassemb1y
/-71JJI1_/
2.3 L~ngth of active fue1
L mrrLI
2.4 Total_1ength of subassemb1y
L 71JJI1_/
2. 5 U02-wei ght per subassemb1y
/-kfL/
2.6 Total weight per subassemb1y
L-kg_/
2.7 Number of fue1 pins per
subassemb1y
2.8 Fue1 pin diameter /-mm-!
3. Reactor vesse1




Batch loading once a year










One cy1indrical vesse1 we1ded to a round bottom, having
4 openings for coo1ing medium.
One f1anged lid with 32 openings for contro1 rod drive
mechanisms, 16 for instrumentation, and 1 for venting.
One vesse1 support ring. One comp1ete insulation for the vesse1 surface.
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Major dimensions











Largest outside diamete~ of the
cylinder Lmm_1
Vessel height (without top)
L-mm_1
External diameter of the lid
L-mm_1
Maximum height of the reactor
pressure vessel (from the bottom
to the top_of ihe control rod
f1ange s) L mm_1
Weight of the lower part L-t_1
Weight of the vessel lid L-t_1
Weight of the vessel lid complete
with control rod drive mechanisms
and lifting fixture
Weight of the upper core structure












L x W x H L-m_1
4.2 Storage capability
Number of subassemblies
8 x 6.2 x 11
162
4.3 Filling medium H20 and boric acid
5. Dry storage
L x W x H l-m_1
Storage capability
Number of subassemb1ies




6. Subassembly transfer machin~s
6.1 Turbine hall crane for loading of fresh or
irradiated subassemblies from or onto
outside truck and interna! vehicles for
storage areas
6.2 Heavy crane for removing shielding
pressure vessel lid and irradiated
subassemblies in a shielded cask
!rom the wet storage
6.3 Light crane for handling fresh fuel
elements within the dry storage
6.4 Fuelling machine, containing fuel
element handling tool for fuel
transport between reactor veseel
a.:nd wet storage
6.5 Light crane for lowering fresh fuel
into wet storage racks
~
(80 + 15 t)
1








Table IV: Characteristics o~ the KWL and KWW power stations
1. General
KWL KWW
1.1 Type H20 cooled and H20 cooled andmoderated t slightly moderated t slightly
enriched uranium enriched uranium
1.2 Location Lingen t Germany Würgassen t Germany
1.3 Thermal power L-Wiltrr..! 520 1912
1.4 Subassembly loading Batch loading under Batch loading under
mechani sm o~~ load condition o~~ load condition
2. Subassemb1y
2.1 Number o~ subassem-
lies in reactor core 284 444
2.2 Width of subassembly
1-rom_I 114.1 134
2.3 Active length_o~ _
subassembly L mrrLI 2935 3660
2.4 Total length o~ sub-
assembly L mItLI 3500 4470
2.5 U02-weightJer_sub-
assembly L k~1 128 220
2.6 Total weight .12.er _
subassemb1y L k~1 187 320
2.7 Number o~ ~el pin
per subassembly 36 49
2.8 Fuel "pin diameter
L-mm_/ 14.3 14.3
3. Reactor vessel
One cy1indrical vesse1 we1ded to a round bottom t
having 10 openings ~or cooling medium and 69 openings
~or bottom entry contro1 rods.
One ~langed top with openings ~or instrumentation.
One vessel support ring.
./ ..
Major dimensions
3.01 Interna1 diameter of the
cy1inder 1-mrrLI
3.02 Largest outside di~eter of
the cy1inder L mm_1
3.03 CylindeL hei:ght (without
top) 1 mm_1
3.04 Maximum height of the
reactor pressure vesse1
3.05 Weight of the lower part
L t_1
3.06 Weight of the top cover
Lt_1


































12 x 8.25 x 7.42
136
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6. Subassemb1y transfer machines
6.1 Heavy crane for transport of
fresh subassemb1ies from out-
side into the dry storage area
6.2 Heavy crane for removing
shie1ding, containment
cover, pressure vesse1 top
and irradiated subassemb1ies
in a shie1ded cask from the
wet storage
6.3 sma11 crane for light duty
6.4 Light crane for handling fresh
fUel elements within the dry
storage
6.5 Fue11ing machine, containing tue1
element manipulator for tue1
transport between reactor vesse1
and wet storage
6.5.1 Light crane for bringing fresh

























Table V: Relevant technical d.ata on four power stations which influence safeguards measures
Atucha KWO KWL KWW
1. Type D20 moderated ~nd cooled,natural uranium
H
2
0 moderated and cooled, H20 moderated and cooled,pressurized water, slight- boiling water, slightly
ly enriched U enriched U





Subassem- Cylindrical; 36 fuel pins;
bly no space for crnntrol rods;
1 empty tube for support-
ing spacers etc; disassem-
bly only by sawing
Dry sto- Outside reactor contain-
rage area ment; served by a 60 t
crane; easily al::cessible
from outside
Wet sto- Outside reactor contain-
rage area ment; served by a 60 t
crane; connected. to
reactor vessel 1chrough
tilting flask w1d fuel
transfer bay; al::cessible
from outside
Square; 180 fuel pins;








ment; served by fuelling
machine, RB crane and
fresh fuel lowering fix-
ture; fuel movement from
and to reactor vesselonly
by fuelling machine and
RB-crane; accessible only
through material and per-
sonnel lock
Square; 36 fuel pins; no









ment; served by fuelling
machine and RB crane;
tuel movement trom and to
reactor vessel with these
two mechanisms; accessible
only through material and
personnel lock
Square; 49 tuel pins;




served by a 2 t crane;
easily accessible trom out-
side
I
Outside reactor containment; ~
served by tuelling machine I
andRB crane; tuel movement
trom and to reactor vessel
with these two mechanisms;
















air lock; served by
fuelling Dlachine; and RB





On load arId of'f' load
From all ddes
From top Emd f'rom
one side
Only f'rom the top
Accessible only thrOUgh
material orpersonnel
lock; served by fuelling
machine and RB crane
Of'f' load
Only f'rom the top
From top and f'rom
one side




machine; and RB crane af'-
ter removal of' concrete
roof'
Of'f' load
Only trom the top
From top and f'rom
one side
Only trom the top
Accessible only through
material or personnel
lock; served by fuelling
machine; and RB crane af'-
ter removal of' containment
top
Of'f' load
Only f'rom the top
From top and f'rom
one side
































FIG.l GENERAL LAY - OUT OF DRY AND WET STORAGE AREAS,













DRY STORAGE AREA CRANE
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FRESH FUEL lOWERING FIXTURE REACTOR VESSEL I TOP REMOVED
FIG.2 GENERAL LAY-OUT OF DRY AND WET STORAGE AREAS 1 REACTOR
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Fig. 3 General layout of dry and wet storage areas,
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Fig.4 General layout of dry and wet storage areas,
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FIG.5 FUEL SUBASSEMBLIES FOR ATUCHA


















6 SarTOM GRID PLATE
7 SEGMENTED ROD
8 LOW ENRICHMEN T PINS
9 ACTiVE ZONE 2936 mm
10 FISSiON GAS PLANUM
173 mm
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FIG. 70 ORGINAL PRINT - OUT FROM DISTANCE - LOAD

















FIG. 7 b DISTANCE - LOAD DIAGRAM FOR FUELLING
































FIG. 8 ACTIVITY OF AN IRRADIATED SUSASSEMBLY
AS MEASURED SY A DETECTOR AT DIFFERENT




Determination of fissile material content in the




The determination of thc total amount of fissile isotopes in a dis-
charged batch of subassemblies can be devided in two steps; firstly,
the determination of fission end absorption rates as functions of
space end time - i.e. practically of the space-time-dependent iso-
topic concentrations, end secondly the integration of the spaee-
dependent isotopie concentrations over the total volume of a dis-
charge batch.
Tbe second step, vhieh sounds quite trivial, is ä very important one
with respect to aeeuracy. Large errors in ealculated loee.! iaotopic
concentrations may be averaged out to a fairly 10'101' degree by inte-
grating over a large volume.
The caleulation of the space-time-dependent isotopie eoncentrations
has to be done consistent with space-time-dependent power and flux
distribution in discrete time steps~ Therefore determination of i50-
topic concentrations requires a co~~lete description of the reactor
history vith respect to coolant conditions, control rod sequence, re-
f'ueling patterns and overaJI thermal power generation.
2. Hethod of calculation
Because of the complicated geometrie distribution of material proper-
ties within a boiling vater reactor there is no possibility of doing
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an "exact" calculation o:f isotopic concentrations. Instead of this,
only an approximnte solution of the problem is possible and is usually
carried out in the following ~~ner:
a) The reactor is subdivided into rectangular cubes. In the
horizontal direction the cross section of a cube corres-
ponds to a so called "bundle cell". A bundle cell contains
the fuel bundle, the ha1:f width o:f the adjoining water gap and,
if existent, the half width of the two wings of an adjoining
control rod.
The principle of calculation is to replace the actual hetero-
geneous cubes by homogeneous ones, using a.dequatly averaged
cross sections, end to solve the neutron diffusion equation
:ror the whole reactor made up o:f homogeneous cubes.
b) The properties of a particular cube are calculated in advance
as a function of average moderator void content and averaß!
burn up vithin the cube, assuming that there is no mutual. inter-
action betveen different cubes. In this way, a kind of library
can be established for the e:ffective homogenized neutron cross
sections for all types of cubes which ever may come up in the
burn up history of a reactor core.
Naturally , this library can only give an approximate description
of tbe real properties of the cubes, as the details of loeal
buro up history within the cube are not considered.
Nevertheless, this model i8 the best one which presently can
be used for reactor design, as it keeps costs for computer time
within r.easonable limita.
c) Onee the effective homogenized cross sections of the cubes as
a function of voids and presence of control rods are given,
the spatial flux and power distribution vithin the reactor for
a particular control rod pattern, overall coolant flov and buro
up distribution can be determined. This evaluation of power
distribution is based on both calculational and instrumentational
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means. Boiling vater reactors of the presently knovn commer-
eial type, are equiped with ineore neutron flux monitors which
show axial thermal flux distributions at about 20 radial posi-
tions of the eore. These flux measurements together with two
dimensional eore diffusion ealeulations for the horizontal
core cross section give the macroseopie power distribution.
d) Integration of loeal pover between two time steps over the en-
elosed time interval yields the differential loeal inerease in
burn up. FolloW'ing the history of 8. eube throughout its irradia-
tion, time in the core, the integrated burn up at the time of
discharge of the bundle containing the cube ean be giVene
e) Finally, from the isotopic library mentioned in item b) t the
average isotopic concentrations within the cube ean be taken as
a :f'unction of the burn up of the cube and the average moderator
void content which the cube experienced during its irradiation
history. Again it must be noted, that no details of isotopic
distribution within the cubes are given.
3. Input data and ealculational models
To make all the calculational steps mentioned above, the knovlec1ge of a
detailed geometrie and material description of the core, camprehensive
operational data and adequate physical models programmed on a digital
computer are required. The essential necessary in:formation is as follows:
a) For the determination of the initial properties of a
reactor one needs:
(i) Geometrie design of fuel rods, fuel bundles,
absorber elements and the core arrangement
(H) 1-faterial specifications of a.ll structural materials
(iii) Fuel enrichment




b) For following the burn up P.i story of the installed fuel
one needs for discrete time steps:
( i ) Thermal reactor pO'"wer
(ii ) Overall coolant flow
(iii) Coolant subcooling
(iv) Coolant pressure
(v) Control rod positions
(vi) Readings of incore neutron flux monitors
(vii) Fuel element reload patterns
c) For determining isotopic conc~ntrations from initial reactor
properties and burn up history a set of physical models and
corresponding computer codes together with consistent nuclear
data and empirical corrections are required. The most important
problem with generally known physical models and corresponding
computer codes is that they fail to give exact results for each
type of reactors. Therefore, for a particulnr reactor type, the
results obtained by the physical models must be fitted ~o experi-
mental data. This fitting is very sensitive to the nuclear input
data used in the model (cross section libraries) and may be applied
either to the results of the model or to the input data. So, essen-
tially, one needs:
(i) Physical models and corresponding digital computer codes
for neutron energy spectrum, neutron flux distribution
and burn up calculations
(ii) Consistent libraries for microscopic isotopic energy
dependent cross sections
(iii) Consistent libraries for integrated cross sections
(like resonance integrals)
(iv) Consistent empirical correction formulas tor
macroscopic cross sections (like blackness of
absorber materials) and macroscopic flux and power
distributions.
4. Accuracy of calculation
It is difficult to estimate the accuracy ofcalculated neutron isotopic
concentrations,because lsrge local errors r:ny be ave~&ged out by
integration over large volumes. Also detailed comperisons bet'Ween cal-
culated and measured mean isotopic concentrations of a bOlling water
reactor discharge batch have not been perfor~cd sofar.
Comparisons of measured local.P1utonium concentrations in discharge tue1
of the "Versuchsatol!'.krattwerk Kahl" (VAK) with calcula.ted numbers are
shown in the fo11owing table:
Isotope relative e:r.'ror of cnlculation
U 235 0 % to 10 %
Pu 239 -5 cf to 15 E!I" i'
Pu 240 -15 % to 25 d/:
Pu 241 +30 cf to "'.- 40 cf{iJ I'
10 sampIes from 10 different iocations in t'7:0 diffe:-cent fuel rods were
taken. Tbe spread of the deviatioue betveen calculated ~~d measured
numbers i8 sho~~ in the table.
The spread of the deviations for oneisotope m~ be reduced by an order
of magnitude when averaging over the ..hole discharge batch; but the
magnitude of the deviations a11d the uncha.'1ged sign f'cr every isotope in..
dicate a systematic error in the calculation cf siotopic concentrations
as a function of buro up.
At the present time it seems that the averf;ge burn up of a discharge
batch may be calculated with &ll accurf:.cy of some 2 %or 3 %, provided
a process computer is availeble. But large errors of the order of 10 %
or more are be expected in case the isotopic ccncentrations are
calculated from relatively exact burn up date..
5. Conclusions
The determination of the fissile material content in the discharged batch
of subassemblies from a boiling vater reactor is cumbersome end expensive.
At present the state of the art in celculating isotopic concentrationa
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does not guarantee accuracies better th~n 10 %.
Improvements may be gained in the future, if numerous system.atic com-
perisons betveen measured ~~d calculated isotopic concentrations of
discharge batches are made end if the results are fed back to the
calculational models. Hovever, bece.use such empirical adjustments
are based on integral measurements t the range of validity vill always
be very small. Therefore, for each reactor t3~et these adjustments
have to be made separately, 'Which is a iteX'".f ti.rn.e a..."ld cost cons'tDting
procedure.
